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I. Introduction
Consider this scenario: an automatic Apple iPhone update
deletes all of Jane’s text messages. Jane’s iPhone is wiped clean,
and there is nothing she can do to get her text messages back.
Apple will quickly send out a carefully crafted apology, which
subtly points out that Jane accepted the risk of this happening due
to some obscure provision in their terms of service she never read.
This rings hollow, though, because Jane still feels like she lost
something of value, something she owned. Even though they were
just words on a screen, Jane’s text messages were a little bit more
than that to her—they felt like a part of who Jane is and who she
was.
These text messages were more than just data and binary
code. They contained Jane’s personal information and
correspondence with friends and family over the years. To Jane,
those virtual text messages felt like her property; she had created
the outgoing messages and received the incoming messages. Even
if she clicked away her right to pursue contractual remedies by
accepting Apple’s terms of service, is there anything Jane can do?
As of today, the answer is a resounding “no.”1 Jane would be
surprised to learn that she cannot successfully sue Apple for
1.

Infra Part IV.A.
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deleting her text messages because her text messages are not
considered personal property. Because text messages are not a
“property,” she would not be able to successfully bring a conversion
or trespass claim, despite the elements of both claims being met.2
Instead, Jane would be limited to a breach of contract claim,
limiting her chances of redress for Apple’s deletion of something
that feels like her personal property.3
Therein lies the problem: courts do not treat text messages as
intangible personal property. Authors and recipients of text
messages have limited recourse against cell phone manufacturers
or service providers when they “accidentally” delete their users’
text messages. Instead, courts consider text messages to be the
product of the contract for services between the cell phone user and
the cell phone provider. Put another way, because text messages
would not exist but-for a cellular service contract, they are not
considered property. Under this “contractually created right”
theory, text message users can bring an action for a breach of
contract when their text messages are improperly deleted, but
that’s about it. Should courts treat text messages as a purely
contractual right, or should text messages constitute intangible
personal property capable of being owned?
This Note argues that text messages are intangible personal
property. This leads to two practical outcomes. First, text message
“owners” can successfully sue using property-based causes of
action (e.g., trespass to chattels and conversion) when their
ownership rights over their text messages are disturbed by the
service provider or cell phone manufacturer. Second, the property
rights inherent in text messages will limit the government’s power
under the third-party doctrine.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II offers a brief overview
of what text messages are and what they are not. Part III covers
the history of intangible personal property law and reviews the
evolution of “cybertrespass” claims. Part IV explores the judiciary
and the Fourth Amendment’s failure to protect text messages.
Finally, Part V evaluates whether text messages constitute
property and the practical implications of this finding.

2.
3.

Infra Part V.A.2.
Infra Part IV.A.1.
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II. Text Messages: An Overview

Text messaging (or texting) is a text-based form of
communication between cell phone users.4 Text messages, as an
alternative to e-mails and phone calls,5 are the predominant form
of communication in society.6 The broad term “text messages”
encompasses text-only messages sent via Short Messages Service
(SMS), picture, video and sound messages (multimedia messages
or MMS), and messages sent through third-party messenger
applications such as iMessage.7 SMS and MMS messages are
transmitted from the sender’s cell phone to an SMS tower, which
then sends the messages to the cell phone service provider’s tower,
which then dispatches the text message to the recipient’s cell
phone.8 Messenger applications use cellular provider data
networks to send text and multimedia messages between mobile
phone users who possess the same messenger application
downloaded on their phones.9
Cell phones are so ingrained in American culture that “[n]o
one ever leaves the house these days without three things: their
keys, wallet and mobile [device]. It is, in short, an essential
lifestyle accessory.”10 Ninety-five percent of American adults own
4. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (defining
text messaging).
5. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 869 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Text messaging is thus an alternative both to email and to telephone
calls.”).
6. See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing
the societal shift in Americans’ private communications methods from phone calls
and letters to text messaging).
7. See Moore, 309 F.R.D. at 536 (“Texting originally only referred to
messages sent using the Short Messages Service (‘SMS’), but now also
encompasses messages containing media such as pictures, videos, and sounds
(‘MMS’).”).
8. See id. (explaining the route SMS and MMS messages take from the
sender’s mobile phone to the receiver’s mobile phone).
9. See id. (distinguishing iMessage and other messenger services from SMS
and MMS messages).
10. Anthony Patterson, Digital Youth, Mobile Phones and Text Messaging:
Assessing the Profound Impact of a Technological Afterthought, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO DIGITAL CONSUMPTION 83 (Russell W. Belk & Rosa
Llamas eds., 2013).
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a cell phone.11 Nearly three-quarters of American adults who own
cell phones send and receive text messages.12 Text messaging
users, on average, send or receive more than forty-one messages
daily, while cell phone owners make or receive an average of ten
phone calls daily.13 In short, most Americans own cell phones, and
Americans use their cell phones to text message more often than
they do to make phone calls or send e-mails.
Although the majority of this Note concerns what text
messages are, it is helpful to narrow the issue’s scope and briefly
explain what text messages are not. Text messages are not
physical or tangible objects.14 Text messages are not copyrightable
and thus not protected by intellectual property law.15 And text
messages are not e-mails.16
A. Text Messages Are Not Physical Property nor Are They
Protected by Copyright
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the intangible data
and text messages contained within the cell phone from the
physical, tangible cell phone object. For example, during an arrest,
the police can search the exterior of a cell phone, but they are
barred from searching the data housed in the phone.17 Internal cell
phone data, contained within a “smart” object, carries greater
constitutional protections than objects held within “simple”

11. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
(detailing trends in mobile phone ownership over time) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
19,
2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/09/19/americans-and-textmessaging/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (describing trends in text message usage
among Americans over time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Id.
14. Infra Part II.A.
15. Infra Part II.A.
16. Infra Part II.B.
17. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 833–34 (2016) (“The physical object
(the phone) could be searched to ensure, for example, that a razor blade was not
hidden inside, but the digital content could not be searched without a warrant.”).
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containers.18 Additionally, although a cell phone owner owns the
physical device itself, the owner does not own the software
contained within, as cell phone providers license (rather than sell)
the software to the cell phone owner for their use.19
Just as there is a distinction between the ownership of the
physical phone and the data and software within, there is also a
distinction between owning the copyright to the contents of a text
message and owning a copy of the text message itself. This is the
“copy/copyright” distinction. In relevant part, the Copyright Act20
states that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied.”21 The copy/copyright
distinction is crucial when establishing ownership rights held in
an intangible property such as a text message,22 and
understanding the copy/copyright distinction is necessary for this
reason: intellectual property law governs copyrights, but property
law governs ownership rights in the underlying material “copy” or
object itself.23
The ownership of a copyright to the content of a given text
message hinges on the length of the text message.24 If a text
message is short, as most text messages tend to be, the author does
18. See id. at 834 (“[T]he Court implicitly creates a distinction between
simple objects and smart objects (with data inside), with the latter being granted
additional protection.”).
19. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and
Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1253–60 (2015) (explaining that
the majority of courts classify software transactions as licenses instead of sales).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
21. See id. (distinguishing ownership of a copyright from ownership of an
object).
22. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 19, at 1216 (“The exhaustion
principle, though historically associated with a clear distinction between copy and
copyright, is in fact the primary tool in copyright law for mediating the somewhat
indistinct line separating the copy and the work.”).
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (distinguishing ownership of a copyright from
ownership of an object).
24. See Edina Harbinja, Legal Nature of Emails: A Comparative Perspective,
14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 227, 235–36 (2016) (“To conclude, despite long emails
meeting the requirement of originality and fixation, there would be a regulatory
vacuum for a significant number of short emails.”).
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not hold the copyright to the content of that message.25 However,
the author likely has copyright protection over the content of the
text message if the text message is lengthy and more complex, an
“original work of authorship,” and is “electronically fixated.”26
Even though copyright law might protect some text messages,
copyright law alone is not adequate to protect all text messages,
and does not protect the text message recipient.27 Thus, because
copyright law does not effectively protect text message authors and
recipients, property law should fill the needed gap and give text
message owners the rights against intrusive cellular service
providers to which they are entitled.
B. Are Text Messages Distinguishable from E-Mails?
The distinction between text messages and e-mails is subtle,
but there are some fundamental differences between the two.28 In
particular, text messages are distinguishable from e-mails both in
how society uses text messages to communicate and in how text
messages mechanically operate.29
While both the judiciary and the legal academy have
addressed the status of e-mails as “property,” the same question
regarding text messages has gone unanswered.30 Most
25. U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
MULTIPLE
WORKS
2
(2019),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf.
26. See Harbinja, supra note 24, at 235 (explaining that longer e-mails meet
the originality and fixation copyright requirements).
27. Id.
28. See Joseph C. Vitale, Note, Text Me, Maybe?: State v. Hinton and the
Possibility of Fourth Amendment Protections Over Sent Text Messages Stored in
Another’s Cell Phone, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1109, 1141 (2014) (arguing that text
messages differ from e-mails because of the different ways society utilizes the
technologies).
29. See id. at 1140–41 (distinguishing text messages from e-mails);
Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o OMG They Searched My Txts: Unraveling the
Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 685, 686 (“[T]ext
messages, unlike letters or e-mails, have in the past only been generally
accessible through a mobile device.”).
30. See, e.g., Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No.
16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288, at *11 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017)
(determining that e-mails constitute intangible personal property); infra note 31
(collecting legal scholarship that addresses the question of whether e-mail is
property).
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commentators who have addressed the issue with regard to e-mails
advocate for the treatment of e-mails as property.31
Courts routinely consider whether e-mails constitute
descendible intangible personal property in the probate context
(and often find that they are property in probate cases), but courts
do not consider whether text messages constitute property with the
same regularity.32 And the recent surge of federal district courts
concluding that e-mails constitute intangible property indicates
that the first “text messages are property” case could be right
around the corner.33 The ever-increasing popularity of text
messages likely signals that courts will have to tackle the issue of
whether text messages constitute property in the coming years.34
What someone might have sent via e-mail ten years ago is sent via
text message today, and thus issues regarding text message
ownership will become more and more common.35
31. See, e.g., Jennifer Arner, Comment, Looking Forward by Looking
Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights
Protections in E-mail, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 349, 379 (Summer 2014) (“[I]f
the Court is willing to recognize true property rights in particular forms of
electronic communication, the property-centered approach relied on in Jones will
afford bright-line protections for these intangible interests.”); Justin Atwater,
Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your
Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397, 418 (“Although e-mail shares
qualities with both tangible and intangible property, the differences create
enough of a distinction that the laws of property cannot effectively deal with who
owns e-mail.”); Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s
Emails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 281, 319 (2007) (“The ownership and intellectual property interests
authors have in their electronically stored e-mail accounts are no less legitimate
than are such interests in messages created with paper and pen.”). But see
Harbinja, supra note 24, at 254 (“Based upon current copyright and property law,
and upon the western theories of property, the legal nature of email appears clear.
Email content is not the property of its users.”).
32. See, e.g., Atwater, supra note 31, at 400–02 (discussing how a probate
court forced Yahoo! to hand over a deceased marine’s e-mails to his parents).
33. Infra notes 118–126 and accompanying text.
34. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining
how text messaging has become “the most widely used mobile data service”).
35. See Lydia Dishman, Texting Is The New Email—Does Your Company Do
It
Right?,
FAST
COMPANY
(May
30,
2013),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3010237/texting-is-the-new-email-does-yourcompany-do-it-right (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (“[T]exting—to the tune of 9.8
trillion sent in 2012—is becoming the new medium through which companies
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III. The History of Intangible Property Law and Cybertrespass
Intangible personal property, as its name suggests, is a
personal property or a “chattel” that cannot be physically
touched.36 Text messages are a form of “digital” property, which is
arguably a type of intangible personal property.37 Courts are split
on whether disrupting possession of someone’s intangible property
is equivalent to disrupting possession of physical property, or,
instead, breaching a contractually created right.38 If a court treats
a dispute over theft of intangible property as a dispute over
personal property, the aggrieved party can pursue a conversion or
trespass to chattels tort claim for the disruption of their intangible
property rights.39 However, if a court treats the same dispute as a
potential breach of a contractually created right, the aggrieved
party cannot bring a tort law cause of action and is limited to
contractual remedies.40
The principal cases involving disputes over the property status
of intangible personal property concerned perhaps the earliest
widely available digital asset: internet domain names.41 These
cases determined whether a domain name was a type of property,
and if it was, whether the aggrieved party could pursue a
traditional property-based claim against the domain name
communicate.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See
Intangible
Personal
Property,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/intangible-personal-property.asp
(last
updated Feb. 12, 2018) (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“Intangible personal property
is something of individual value that cannot be touched or held.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. Id.
38. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that the taking of an intangible property provided the basis for a property law
conversion claim). But see Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80,
85–88 (Va. 2000) (finding that the taking of an intangible property disrupted a
contractual, and not a property, right).
39. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029–36 (determining that the defendant’s
giving away of the plaintiff’s intangible property without his consent “supported
a claim for conversion”).
40. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 85–88 (explaining that a domain name,
although an intangible property, is the product of a service contract that does not
exist separate from the service that created it and is therefore a contractually
created right).
41. Infra Part III.A–B.
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registrar.42 To be sure, text messages are not domain names, but
both text messages and domain names arguably constitute forms
of intangible personal property.43 Accordingly, the courts’
reasoning in the domain name cases applies to situations involving
other intangible personal properties, such as text messages.44
This Part, in subparts A and B, proceeds by analyzing the two
leading cases for and against the theory that digital property
constitutes intangible personal property. Then, subpart C
contrasts these two cases and explores what drove the courts to
come out on opposite sides of the issue. Finally, subpart D tracks
the evolution of property law tort remedies as applied to digital
property and examines recent federal court cases determining that
e-mails constitute property.
A. The Intangible Personal Property Theory: Digital Assets Can
Be Owned
Enter Kremen v. Cohen.45 Kremen involved a California
plaintiff, Gary Kremen, who sought conversion damages from a
defendant who stole Kremen’s internet domain name.46 Kremen
bought the domain name “sex.com” through a domain name
registrar.47 Shortly thereafter, a con man named Stephen Cohen
duped the domain name registrar into transferring possession of
Kremen’s sex.com domain name to Cohen’s account.48 Kremen
then sued Cohen and the domain name registrar, claiming that the
tort of conversion applied to Cohen’s stealing Kremen’s sex.com
domain name.49
42. Infra Part III.A–B.
43. Infra Part V.A.
44. Infra Part V.A.
45. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
46. See id. at 1026 (“We decide whether Network Solutions may be liable for
giving away a registrant’s domain name on the basis of a forged letter.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1027.
49. See id. at 1028 (“His third theory is that he has a property right in the
domain name sex.com, and Network Solutions committed the tort of conversion
by giving it away to Cohen.”).

TEXT MESSAGES ARE PROPERTY

1083

Before Kremen could prove the tort of conversion, he first had
to prove that the domain name Cohen took constituted a piece of
property.50 The Ninth Circuit defines property as a “broad concept
that includes every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible
of possession or disposition.”51 Under the court’s three-part test, a
digital asset constitutes personal property if: (1) there is “an
interest capable of precise definition”; (2) it is “capable of exclusive
possession or control”; and (3) there is a “legitimate claim to
exclusivity.”52
The Ninth Circuit found that domain names satisfied each
criterion required under the three-part property test.53 First, the
court explained that domain names are capable of precise
definition because the person who registers the domain name
chooses exactly where on the internet those who type that
particular domain name are sent.54 Second, the court noted that
domain names are capable of exclusive possession or control
because the registrant alone decides on what the domain name will
be.55 Finally, the court reasoned that there is a legitimate claim to
exclusivity with regard to domain names, because registering a
domain name is a way of communicating sole ownership of the
internet domain to others, ensuring registrants gain a benefit on
their time and money spent developing their websites, and
encouraging investment in domain names and the internet
overall.56

50. See id. 1029–30 (explaining that Kremen must first establish that he had
a property right in the domain name before he can make a conversion tort claim).
51. Id. at 1030.
52. Id.
53. See id. (finding that “Kremen therefore had an intangible property right
in his domain name”).
54. See id. (“Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of land, a domain name
is a well-defined interest.”).
55. See id. (“Ownership is exclusive in that the registrant alone makes that
decision.”).
56. See id. at 1030
Registrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering a
domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office.
It informs others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one
else’s. Many registrants also invest substantial time and money to
develop and promote websites that depend on their domain names.
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After determining that Kremen owned property rights to his
domain name, the court analyzed whether the tort of conversion
applied to disputes regarding intangible property.57 Historically,
intangible property conversion claims required that a document
exist where the intangible rights are merged into the physical
document.58 This means that there is a physical document that
represents and is equivalent to the intangible obligation (e.g., a
stock certificate representing ownership of a share of stock).59
However, the court explained that courts in California had rejected
the strict merger requirement. But, even if the merger
requirement applied, it was minimal and required only some
relationship with a tangible object.60 The court reasoned that
Kremen’s sex.com domain name digital file must be stored within
a physical computer associated with the domain name provider
somewhere, and found that this connection was sufficient to satisfy
conversion’s merger requirement.61
This finding, coupled with the court’s determination that
Kremen had a property right in his domain name, led the court to
conclude that Kremen brought a viable conversion claim.62 In
closing, the court justified its conclusion by noting that “the
57. See id. at 1029 (“To establish that tort, a plaintiff must show ‘ownership
or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and
damages.’” (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc.,
958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992))).
58. See id. at 1031
An intangible is “merged” in a document when, “by the appropriate rule
of law, the right to the immediate possession of a chattel and the power
to acquire such possession is represented by [the] document,” or when
“an intangible obligation [is] represented by [the] document, which is
regarded as equivalent to the obligation.”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1033 (“Assuming arguendo that California retains some
vestigial merger requirement, it is clearly minimal, and at most requires only
some connection to a document or tangible object—not representation of the
owner’s intangible interest in the strict Restatement sense.” (emphasis in
original)).
61. See id. at 1033–34 (“We agree that the [domain name database] is a
document (or perhaps more accurately a collection of documents). . . . That it is
stored in electronic form rather than on ink and paper is immaterial.”).
62. See id. at 1036 (“The evidence supported a claim for conversion.”).
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common law does not stand idle while the people give away the
property of others.”63
B. The Contractually Created Right Theory: Digital Assets Cannot
Be Owned
Just as Kremen stands for the proposition that domain names
are property, Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International,
Inc.64 represents the legal theory that domain names are not
property.65 In Umbro, plaintiff Umbro International, Inc. (Umbro)
sought to garnish thirty-eight domain names held by defendant
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI).66 Umbro previously obtained a
judgment against a debtor in an unrelated bankruptcy action, and
thereafter instituted this garnishment proceeding against NSI to
collect on the debtor’s domain names held by NSI.67 Umbro sought
a court order requiring NSI to begin the process of preparing the
domain names for a sheriff’s sale.68 NSI responded to Umbro’s
lawsuit by claiming that it did not own any of the debtor’s
property.69 NSI argued that the domain names were contractually
created rights, which arose from NSI’s contractual relationship
with the debtor; thus, the domain names were not property capable
of garnishment.70
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with NSI and
determined that the intangible domain names were created solely
because of a contractual relationship, and, thus, incapable of

63. Id.
64. 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
65. See Milton L. Mueller & Farzaneh Badiei, Governing Internet Territory:
ICANN, Sovereignty Claims, Property Rights and Country Code Top-Level
Domains, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 435, 475 (2017) (explaining that Umbro
has become one of the “most commonly cited” cases to prove that domain names
are service contracts).
66. See Network Sols. Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000)
(“In this case of first impression, we address the issue whether a contractual right
to use an Internet domain name can be garnished.”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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garnishment.71 Because the debtor’s rights to the domain names
did not exist “separate and apart from” NSI’s services to the debtor,
the court deemed the domain names the but-for product of a
contract.72 Although the court agreed that the registrant gained
the right to use the domain names upon registration, the right to
use the domain names was “inextricably linked” to NSI’s services.73
Therefore, because garnishment proceedings are limited to
liabilities owed, and service contracts are not within the statutory
definition of the term “liabilities,” the court reasoned that Umbro
could not garnish NSI’s domain names.74
Umbro stands for the proposition that domain names, and
intangible property generally, are the product of a contract
between the digital asset user and the digital asset provider.75
Remarkably, NSI itself acknowledged and conceded that domain
names constitute an intangible property during oral argument.76
Although the court briefly analyzed the “contractually created
right” versus “intangible property” argument, it dismissed NSI’s
oral argument concession and explained that classifying domain
names as a type of property was not dispositive of the case.77 The
71. See id. at 86 (“A contract for services is not ‘a liability’ as that term is
used in § 8.01–511 and hence is not subject to garnishment.”).
72. See id. (“[W]hatever contractual rights the judgment debtor has in the
domain names at issue in this appeal, those rights do not exist separate and apart
from NSI’s services. Therefore . . . a domain name registration is the product of a
contract for services between the registrar and registrant.”).
73. See id. (“[W]e agree with Umbro that a domain name registrant acquires
the contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of time.
However, that contractual right is inextricably bound to the domain name
services that NSI provides.”).
74. See id. (“[A] contract for services is not ‘a liability’ as that term is used in
§ 8.01–511 and hence is not subject to garnishment.”).
75. See Mueller & Badiei, supra note 65, at 475 (explaining why Umbro has
become “one of the cases most commonly cited to prove that domain names are
services”).
76. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 (“[W]e must point out that NSI
acknowledged during oral argument before this Court that the right to use a
domain name is a form of intangible personal property.”).
77. See id. at 770 (“However, NSI’s acknowledgement is not dispositive of
this appeal. Likewise, we do not believe that it is essential to the outcome of this
case to decide whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as
a ‘form of intellectual property.’”).
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court made clear that it did not garnish NSI’s domain names
because it feared that doing so would make practically any service
contract garnishable.78
The Umbro case garnered a significant amount of criticism not
for its holding, but for what the court failed to address.79 Although
Kremen plainly stands for the proposition that property rights
exist in domain names,80 Umbro’s substantive holding is not that
domain names are contractually created rights.81 The only legal
conclusion Umbro drew is that domain names do not fall within
the definition of “liability” as an element of the Virginia
garnishment statute.82 The court in Umbro briefly discussed only
the property status of domain names in dicta when noting that NSI
conceded that domain names were intangible property at oral
argument.83 Even though Umbro casually observed that a domain
name represented a contractual right, the court never explicitly
stated that domain names are not intangible property.84 The court
in Umbro even attempted to back away from making any definitive
statements regarding domain name property rights (or lack

78. See id. at 771 (“If we allow the garnishment of NSI’s services in this case
because those services create a contractual right to use a domain name, we believe
that practically any service would be garnishable.”).
79. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments:
Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 97, 108 (2003) (calling
Umbro a “red herring” case because it did not expressly hold that a domain name
is not property).
80. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kremen
therefore had an intangible property right in his domain name . . . .”).
81. See Daniel Hancock, Note, You Can Have It, But Can You Hold It?:
Treating Domain Names as Tangible Property, 99 KY. L.J. 185, 192–93 (2011)
(“Umbro is often cited for the proposition that a domain name is simply a
contractual arrangement and therefore cannot be a property right. This assertion
is a misreading of the case.”).
82. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 108 (“The court simply said that a
domain name did not constitute a ‘liability’ for the purpose of the Virginia
garnishment statute.”).
83. See Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000)
(“Initially, we must point out that NSI acknowledged during oral argument before
this Court that the right to use a domain name is a form of intangible personal
property.”).
84. See id. at 770 (“[W]e agree with Umbro that a domain name registrant
acquires the contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period
of time.”).
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thereof), noting that whether or not domain names constitute
intangible property was not essential to the outcome of the case.85
C. Comparing the Intangible Property Theory to the Contractually
Created Right Theory
Kremen and Umbro represent the two prevailing views on
digital property’s status as either intangible property or a contract
for services.86 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Kremen case
stands for the theory that a digital asset is an intangible property
owned by the user.87 And although the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Umbro never explicitly said so, the Umbro case stands for the
theory that a digital asset is the product of a contract entered into
between a user and a digital asset provider.88
Kremen and Umbro’s different outcomes are better understood
when comparing the two distinguishing factors that led to their
contrasting outcomes: (1) the unique parties to each case and
(2) the different laws applied in each case. Kremen involved
sympathetic plaintiff Gary Kremen, a “geek-turned-entrepreneur”
who thought he hit the jackpot when he became the “proud owner”
of sex.com (implying from the outset that domain names could be
owned as property).89 Kremen, unable to collect any of his initial
$65 million judgment against domain thief Stephen Cohen (on
account of Cohen fleeing the country), sued the deep-pocketed
domain name provider responsible for carelessly transferring his
domain to Cohen.90
85. See id. (“[W]e do not believe that it is essential to the outcome of this case
to decide whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as a
form of ‘intellectual property.’”).
86. See Mueller & Badiei, supra note 65, at 472–73 (describing the property
status of domain names as “less than settled” after twenty years of debate).
87. See Hancock, supra note 81, at 194–95 (calling the Kremen case
illustrative of the view the domain names are intangible property).
88. See id. at 191–92 (explaining that Umbro represents the view that
domain names are primarily contractual rights).
89. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1026–28 (describing Gary Kremen as computer
geek who beat the hordes of NASDAQ day traders to become “the proud owner of
sex.com”).
90. See id. at 1035 (“Kremen never did anything. It would not be unfair to
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Umbro involved unsympathetic plaintiff Umbro International,
a multinational sporting equipment manufacturer, who tried to
gain control of umbro.com from a “classic domain name pirate”91
who held the “contractual right to use” the domain name (implying
from the outset that the domain names were the but-for product of
a contractual relationship).92 Umbro International, which had
already received the prized umbro.com domain as part of the
original default judgment against the cybersquatter, pursued
garnishment of the domain names solely to pay off its attorney’s
fees.93
Kremen had his domain name involuntarily transferred from
him, needed the money, and had run out of legal options.94
Conversely, Umbro International, a successful corporation, sought
possession of a domain name it never previously owned or lost, and
could likely absorb the relatively small amount of attorney’s fees it
sought to garnish.95 It is therefore unsurprising that the Kremen
court awarded down-on-his-luck Gary Kremen recourse against
the culpable defendant,96 while the Umbro court declined to award
Umbro International the domain names to pay off its attorney’s
fees.97
hold Network Solutions responsible and force it to try to recoup its losses by
chasing down Cohen. This, at any rate, is the logic of the common law, and we do
not lightly discard it.”).
91. See Umbro Int’l, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 140 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1999) (describing the judgment debtor who owned umbro.com as a “classic
domain name pirate”).
92. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81 (“[W]e address the issue whether a
contractual right to use an Internet domain name can be garnished.”).
93. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 105 (“Like many judgment debtors,
Canada, Inc. did not write a check to Umbro, so like many judgment creditors,
Umbro was forced to find property against which to enforce its judgment.”).
94. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kremen
never did anything. It would not be unfair to hold Network Solutions responsible
and force it to try to recoup its losses by chasing down Cohen. This, at any rate,
is the logic of the common law, and we do not lightly discard it.” (emphasis in
original)).
95. See Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000)
(describing Umbro International’s default judgment regarding umbro.com
against 3263851 Canada).
96. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036 (“The evidence supported a claim for
conversion, and the district court should not have rejected it.”).
97. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 88 (“Even though the Internet is a ‘new avenue
of commerce,’ we cannot extend established legal principles beyond their
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A second important distinction between Kremen and Umbro
lies in the different legal doctrines at play within each case. Gary
Kremen’s conversion claim was based on the common law tort, a
necessary element of which was the court’s determination that
domain names constitute intangible property.98 The flexible
common law basis of Kremen’s conversion claim gave the court
leeway to determine an equitable outcome.99
In contrast, Umbro International’s garnishment claim was
based on a Virginia statute that did not require the court to
determine whether domain names constitute intangible personal
property.100 Umbro’s rigid statutory basis constrained the court to
solely determining whether a domain name was within the
definition of a “liability” under the Virginia garnishment law.101 In
short, the Kremen court had to declare that domain names

statutory parameters. . . . For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the
circuit court, dismiss the garnishment summons, and enter final judgment in
favor of NSI.” (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D.
Ill. 1996))).
98. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (explaining that the California common
law tort of conversion required the plaintiff to show ownership or a right to
possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property, and damages).
99. See id. at 1036 (explaining that the court will “apply the common law
until the legislature tells us otherwise. And the common law does not stand idle
while people give away the property of others”).
100. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 85 (describing garnishment in Virginia as “a
creature of statute unknown to the common law, and hence the provisions of the
statute must be strictly satisfied”).
101. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 105 (“Garnishment, an action that did
not exist at common law, is a creature solely of statute. . . . The Virginia
garnishment statute is specific as to what types of property it covers and under
the statute, only a ‘liability’ to the judgment debtor can be garnished.”).
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constitute intangible property to reach an equitable outcome,102
while the Umbro court did not.103
D. The Evolution of Cybertrespass
Fifteen years after Kremen and Umbro, the question of
whether intangible property can be converted or trespassed upon
remains far from settled.104 However, Kremen’s intangible property
102. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036
The district court thought there were “methods better suited to
regulate the vagaries of domain names” and left it “to the legislature
to fashion an appropriate statutory scheme.” The legislature, of course,
is always free (within constitutional bounds) to refashion the system
that courts come up with. But that doesn’t mean we should throw up
our hands and let private relations degenerate into a free-for-all in the
meantime. We apply the common law until the legislature tells us
otherwise. And the common law does not stand idle while people give
away the property of others.
(internal citation omitted).
103. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 88 (“Even though the Internet is a ‘new avenue
of commerce,’ we cannot extend established legal principles beyond their
statutory parameters. . . . For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the
circuit court, dismiss the garnishment summons, and enter final judgment in
favor of NSI.” (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D.
Ill. 1996))).
104. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030–35 (explaining what constitutes an
intangible personal property and determining that an intangible personal
property can be the basis for a conversion claim); Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.,
460 F.3d 400, 405 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that although it “is unclear and
unresolved” whether electronic data constitutes intangible property, the Kremen
theory is one possible solution to the issue at hand); Emke v. Compana, L.L.C.,
No. 3:06-CV-1416-L, 2007 WL 2781661, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007)
(explaining that a claim of conversion of a domain name depends on what state
law is applied); Dethmers Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg., 23 F. Supp. 2d
974, 1006–07 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (surveying state caselaw to decide that Nebraska
law might allow a claim for conversion of an unpatented idea); Curtis Mfg. Co. v.
Plasti-Clip Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1212, 1233–34 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that the
plaintiff could make a claim for conversion of an idea). But see Kaempe v. Myers,
367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e conclude that it remains unclear
whether D.C. law would permit an action for conversion of patent rights. The D.C.
courts have never ruled on whether, or under what circumstances, intangible
property of this nature can be the subject of a suit for conversion.”); In re TJX Co.
Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D. Mass. 2007) (determining
that Massachusetts law does not support a claim for conversion of intangible
account data); Famology.com Inc. v. Perot Sys. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that because domain names are not tangible personal
property, the plaintiff could not bring a conversion action under Pennsylvania
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theory is spreading beyond domain name cases, as courts have
recognized websites,105 trademarks,106 licenses,107 investor lists,108
and even expressed ideas109 as forms of intangible property.
Because the internet’s various equipment and virtual facilities
are “not by any stretch of the imagination real property,” the
technological revolution forced courts and legal scholars to
reevaluate the property laws governing the various digital devices
that make up the internet.110 The digital devices that constitute
the internet are a “new” form of chattel, so it is logical that the law
of trespass to chattels and conversion evolved to govern these
devices.111 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the classic
language of an actionable trespass to chattels claim:

law).
105. See Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Tech., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah
2009) (explaining that a website is personal property because it “has a physical
presence on computer drive, causes tangible effects on computers, and can be
perceived by the senses”).
106. See English & Sons, Inc. v. Straw Hat Rest., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 904,
921 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
Trademarks, service marks, trade names, and much of the other
intellectual property at issue here, meet this test. These can be
precisely defined, exclusively possessed and controlled, and they can
be the subject of a legitimate claim to such exclusivity. Under Kremen,
then, such intellectual property should normally be proper objects of
conversion.
107. See M.C. Multi-Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assoc., Ltd., 193 P.3d
536, 543 (Nev. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that a contractor’s license is intangible
personal property that may be converted under Nevada law.”).
108. See Shmueli v. Corcoran Grp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (N.Y. Sup. 2005)
(“The court, therefore, finds that plaintiff’s computerized client/investor list is
convertible property.”).
109. See Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Although an idea alone cannot be converted, the ‘tangible
expression or implementation of that idea’ can be.” (quoting Matzan v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 134 A.D.2d 863, 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987))).
110. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003)
(explaining how the rise of the internet has caused a “rethinking of the property
relations governed by the common law of trespass”).
111. See id. (“[T]he focus of emphasis shifts because the various equipment
and facilities that make up the internet are not by any stretch of the imagination
real property. Rather, they are a new form of chattel, which are presumptively
governed by the law of trespass to chattels.”).

TEXT MESSAGES ARE PROPERTY

1093

One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to
the possessor of the chattel if, but only if,
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value,
or
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a
substantial time, or
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally
protected interest.112

The earliest virtual trespass to chattels (cybertrespass) cases
involved unauthorized intrusions via the internet upon computer
equipment.113 These intrusions were serious enough to either
overload the plaintiffs’ computers and cause them to crash or
crowd their hard drives’ limited space with e-mails and burden the
system owner with the task of deleting them.114 More recently,
virtual trespass to chattels cases have involved plaintiffs bringing
claims based on trespass to intangible personal properties, such as
social media accounts115 and e-mails.116
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
113. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063,
1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting eBay a preliminary injunction against Bidder’s
Edge web spiders based on a trespass to chattels claim even though Bidder’s Edge
software occupied, at most, between 1.11% and 1.53% of eBay’s servers); Am.
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding the
defendant liable for trespass to chattels for sending unauthorized bulk e-mails);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027–28 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (granting the plaintiff a preliminary injunction to stop defendant’s
spam e-mails under a trespass to chattels theory). But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,
71 P.3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003) (denying Intel’s trespass to chattel claim because
Hamidi’s mass e-mails did not physically damage Intel’s servers).
114. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028 (“High volumes of junk e-mail
devour computer processing and storage capacity, slow down data transfer
between computers over the Internet by congesting the electronic paths through
which the messages travel, and cause recipients to spend time and money wading
through messages that they do not want.”).
115. See Salonclick LLC v. SuperEgo Mgmt. LLC, 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017
WL 239379, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (establishing that social media
accounts are intangible personal property capable of being the subject of a
conversion action, but dismissing the plaintiff’s trespass to chattels action
because the social media account itself did not suffer injury as a result of
defendant’s trespass).
116. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS,
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Although text messages are a different form of digital
communication from e-mails,117 two recent opinions determining
that e-mails constitute intangible personal property could outline
the legal framework courts will apply to disputes over text
messages in future cases.118 In Porters Building Centers, Inc. v.
Sprint Lumber,119 a Missouri federal district court determined that
if an intangible property has a connection to tangible property, the
intangible property is a chattel capable of being the subject of a
trespass to chattels action.120 The court then explained that
e-mails are a “chattel” because e-mail communications are
connected to tangible servers stored in physical data centers.121
After determining that e-mails constitute a “chattel,” the court
concluded that the plaintiff had a valid trespass to chattels claim
against the defendant for improperly accessing and reading his
personal e-mails.122
As well, in Skapinetz v. CoesterVMS.com Inc.,123 a Maryland
federal district court determined that e-mails, while not a
traditional form of property, constitute “digital” property
nonetheless.124 This case again concerned a client’s improper
2017 WL 4413288, at *15 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (establishing that e-mails are
intangible personal property, and thus a chattel, because the e-mail
communication is connected to a tangible server, and thus allowing plaintiff’s
trespass to chattels claim to survive summary judgment).
117. Supra Part II.B.
118. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., 2017 WL 4413288, at *11 (finding that e-mails
constitute intangible personal property because personal property can be
intangible if there is a connection to tangible property, and the e-mail
“communications are connected to something tangible—i.e., Google’s servers”).
119. No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017).
120. See id. at *11 (“The Court concludes Missouri courts would find a
trespass to chattel claim includes an email communication when the email
communication is connected to a tangible object, such as a server.”).
121. See id. (“The Court takes judicial notice that Google stores its customers’
email communications on servers. . . . Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] email
communications are connected to something tangible—i.e., Google’s servers.”).
122. See id. (concluding that because a “chattel” extends to intangible
property when the intangible property is connected to a tangible object, the
plaintiff could maintain his trespass to chattels action against the defendant).
123. No. PX-17-1098, 2018 WL 805393 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2018).
124. See id. at *4 (“Although email accounts and electronic communications
are not tangible property in the traditional sense, many courts have recognized
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access to a former employer’s personal Gmail account.125 After
finding that e-mails constitute digital property, the court
proceeded to determine that Georgia law allowed for both trespass
to chattels claims and conversion claims involving intangible
personal property such as e-mails.126 By extension, the courts’
reasoning in Porters Building Centers and Skapinetz could just as
easily have applied to a case involving improper access to an
iMessage account.
In sum, intangible property law has evolved beyond Kremen’s
domain names to encompass a diverse group of digital assets.
Courts are increasingly receptive to plaintiffs bringing
property-based claims when their digital assets are trespassed
upon or stolen. But, when plaintiffs do not bring these
property-based causes of action, the judiciary defaults to Umbro’s
“contractually created right” theory when dealing with digital
assets,127 as Part IV will show.128
IV. The Law Does Not Protect Text Messages
A. The Judiciary Does Not Protect Text Messages: The iMessage
Litigation
The cases discussed below, centering around the Apple text
messaging application “iMessage,” merit thorough analysis
because they are the only instances in which the judiciary has
analyzed disputes regarding iMessage delivery problems.129 The
cases do not analyze the disputes over missing and delayed text

claims for conversion or trespass to chattels involving digital ‘property.’”).
125. See id. (“Skapinetz pleads that Defendants committed the torts of
trespass and conversion by accessing without authorization, and intermeddling
with, Skapinetz’s email accounts and electronic communications.”).
126. See id. (“These facts, taken as true, plausibly establish that Defendants
assumed and exercised the right of ownership over Skapinetz’s email accounts,
albeit briefly, and these actions were inconsistent with Skapinetz’s property
rights. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the common law claim for
conversion (Count Four) is DENIED.”).
127. Supra Part III.B.
128. Infra Part IV.A.
129. Infra Part IV.A.
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messages as if they were property trespassed upon or stolen.130
Instead, the cases treat the disputes over text message delivery as
a contractual dispute, harkening back to Umbro’s analysis of the
specific terms of the contractual agreement.131
The iMessage litigation attracted a fair amount of publicity132
because many former iPhone users experienced, and continue to
experience,133 similar iMessage disruptions after switching to a
non-Apple device.134 iMessage, Apple’s proprietary text messaging
service, is available only on Apple devices, and Apple works hard
to keep it that way.135 This strategy seems to work for Apple, as
iPhone users often cite iMessage as the sole reason they refrain
130. Infra Part IV.A.
131. Infra Part IV.A.
132. See Christina Bonnington, Apple Hit with Federal Lawsuit Over
iMessage
Delivery
Issues,
WIRED
(Nov.
11,
2014,
7:55
PM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/apple-lawsuit-imessages/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2019) (detailing the lawsuit a former iPhone user brought against Apple for
interfering with the delivery of iMessage text messages after the former iPhone
user switched to an Android phone) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
133. See, e.g., Terry Storch (@TerryStorch), TWITTER (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://twitter.com/TerryStorch/status/805540549361070080 (last visited Mar.
19, 2019) (“The transition from iPhone to Android is still rough because of
iMessage. As hard as you try, messages still get lost in the Interwebs.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lucocis, After Almost 18 Months of
Being on Android, I Still Have Problems Because of iMessages, REDDIT (May 26,
2016),
https://www.reddit.com/r/Android/comments/40np11/after_almost_18_months_of
_being_on_android_i/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (describing a former iPhone
user’s struggle with losing text messages after switching to an Android device)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. See Damon Beres, Apple Trapped Me on iOS—Perhaps Forever,
MASHABLE (Oct. 4, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/10/04/the-iphone-owns-mysoul/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“If you switch to Android from iOS, I can nearly
guarantee that you will miss texts from people you care about, and you may not
be able to figure out how to fix it, exactly.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
135. See Chance Miller, This App Claims to Bring iMessage Support to
Android, But Don’t Expect It To Last, 9TO5MAC (Dec. 12, 2017, 3:39 PM),
https://9to5mac.com/2017/12/12/imessage-support-on-android-app/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2019) (“As has been the case with previous services that claim to add
iMessages support to Android, you shouldn’t expect this one to last for long. Apple
generally does a good job of cracking down on these sorts of applications.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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from switching to a non-Apple cellular device.136 Even if Apple’s
self-contained technological ecosystem works fine for those who
stick to Apple products, those who manage to escape Apple’s
“walled garden” soon find that making the switch is more painful
than expected.137
1. Does Withholding Text Messages Amount to Tortious
Interference with Contract?
Moore v. Apple, Inc.138 involved a plaintiff who claimed she
failed to receive iMessage text messages after she switched from
an Apple iPhone to an Android device.139 Adrienne Moore, who
switched from an iPhone to a Samsung device running Android
operating software, sued Apple because she failed to receive
“countless text messages sent to her from Apple device users.”140
136. See, e.g., Patrick Holland, iPhone’s Blue Bubble Won’t Let Me Stray to the
Galaxy S8, CNET (Apr. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-theiphones-blue-bubble-keeps-me-from-going-android/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
(“So if iMessage doesn’t hop ship to Android, then I probably won’t either.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Damon Beres, iMessage Is the
Only Thing Keeping Me on an iPhone, MASHABLE (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://mashable.com/2017/02/10/imessage-is-keeping-me-oniphone/#lKJYsF9EEmq8 (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“Apple has trapped me.
iMessage, for the foreseeable future, will be the reason I stay on an iPhone, the
reason I update my iOS software and ultimately the reason I buy a new iPhone
when upgrade time rolls around.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Lauren Goode, iMessage is the Glue that Keeps Me Stuck to the iPhone,
VERGE
(Oct.
10,
2016,
9:36
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/10/13225514/apple-iphone-cant-switch-pixelandroid-imessage-addiction (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (“Of course Apple wasn’t
going to allow iMessage to function on Android: iMessage is the glue that keeps
people stuck to their iPhones and Macs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
137. See Victor Luckerson, Apple Acknowledges iMessage Problems, TIME
(May 22, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/tech/mobile/apleimessage-problems-fix/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“But some people
who switch from an iPhone to a non-Apple device have found it difficult to
dissociate their phone numbers from iMessage. That leads to text messages from
friends getting sucked up into Apple’s database and disappearing.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
139. See id. at 1195 (“Plaintiff replaced her iPhone 4 with a Samsung Galaxy
S5. As a result of that switch, Plaintiff alleges that she has failed to received
countless text messages sent to her from Apple device users.”).
140. See id. (describing plaintiff Adrienne Moore’s factual allegations

1098

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073 (2019)

Moore reached out to Verizon, her cellular service provider, and
Apple, and although both acknowledged that she was experiencing
a known issue, their proposals to troubleshoot the problem were
ultimately unsuccessful.141 The California federal district court
noted that “[Moore was] not the only former Apple device user to
encounter the problem of undelivered text messages.”142 Despite
her repeated attempts to rectify the situation and receive text
messages from iPhone users, Moore continued to miss text
messages.143 Further, Moore stated that had she known about the
undelivered text message problem at the outset, she would not
have used iMessage or purchased an iPhone in the first place.144
Moore claimed that Apple’s failure to deliver iMessages to her
Android device (1) tortiously interfered with her Verizon contract
and (2) violated California’s Unfair Competition Law145 (UCL) and
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act146 (CLRA).147 Although
the court dismissed Moore’s statutory UCL and CLRA claims, her
tortious interference with contract claim survived the motion to
dismiss.148
Moore claimed that (1) there was a valid contract between her
and Verizon Wireless; (2) Apple had knowledge of this contract;
(3) Apple intentionally acted to induce a breach or disruption of her
contractual relationship with Verizon; (4) there was an actual
breach or disruption of her contract; and (5) that there was

regarding her failure to receive text messages after switching from an iPhone to
an Android device).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.).
146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019
Reg. Sess.).
147. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1195 (outlining Moore’s causes of action).
148. See id. at 1205 (“[I]n summary, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s unlawful business practice UCL claim based on Plaintiff’s
tortious interference with contract claim. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s unfair business practice UCL claim with prejudice.”).
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resulting damage.149 The court, in finding Moore sufficiently
alleged her tortious interference with contract claim, determined
that (1) a valid contract existed between Moore and Verizon which
established the duty to send and receive text messages; (2) Apple
had knowledge of Moore’s contract with Verizon; (3) Apple knew
about the undelivered text messages issue and did not alert Moore;
and (4) Apple’s iMessage application prevented Moore from
fulfilling her contractual right to send and receive text
messages.150
Following the court’s decision to allow her case to proceed on
the tortious interference with contract claim, Moore obtained
documents during discovery which seemingly strengthened her
claim.151 Moore cited internal e-mails from Google showing the
iMessage problem persisted and Apple’s troubleshooting tips on
solving the undelivered text message problem did not work.152
What is more, she cited internal e-mails from Apple employees who
were aware of the iMessage issue and apparently knew that
Apple’s guidance on fixing the problem was ineffective.153
Notwithstanding Moore’s additional evidence of Apple’s
mishandling of the situation, the court later denied Moore’s motion
for class certification under Rule 23.154 Although the court
conceded that Moore satisfied the Article III standing requirement,
the court denied her motion because her proposed class did not
(1) satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement or (2) satisfy
Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.155 Rule 23(a) requires a
149. See id. at 1202–03 (evaluating whether Moore’s tortious interference
with contract claim alleged enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face).
150. Id.
151. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing
the plaintiff’s evidence regarding Apple’s awareness of the iMessage problem).
152. See id. (“Plaintiff cites internal emails from Google, Inc., from early 2015
indicating that the iMessage problem was not only persisting, but that the
‘iMessage deregistration tool doesn’t work.’” (internal citations omitted)).
153. See id. (“Plaintiff also points to Apple’s own internal documents
apparently discussing how Apple’s ‘so-called fixes’ failed to address the
disruptions in text message delivery.”).
154. See id. at 549 (denying Moore’s motion for class certification because her
“proposed class includes, by definition, proposed class members who could not
have suffered any injury and that individualized questions with respect to
Defendant’s liability will predominate over any common questions of law or fact”).
155. See id. at 548 (“In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the question of
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common contention that “must be of such nature that it is capable
of classwide resolution—which means the determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke.”156 Rule 23(b)’s
predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation”
and analyzes “the relationship between the common and
individual issues in the case.”157
The court held that Moore’s proposed class did not meet Rule
23(a)’s commonality requirement because not every class member
could claim they suffered the same contractual injury of not
receiving text messages due to iMessage.158 And Moore’s proposed
class did not meet Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement because
the contractual variations among class members would necessitate
individualized inquiries into each claimant’s contractual rights.159
The court’s decision, albeit organized in separate analyses
under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), essentially hinged on a simple
contractual issue: members of the proposed class each had
different cellular service contracts containing different contractual
provisions.160 Because the members of the proposed class each had
different cellular contracts, the court could not determine that each
contract created the same contractual duty to send and receive text
messages that Moore’s did.161 Consequently, because there were
whether iMessage is the cause of any contractual breach or interference satisfies
the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a), much less the predominance
requirement under Rule 23(b).”).
156. Id. at 549.
157. Id. at 543.
158. Id. at 548–49.
159. Id. at 546–47.
160. See id. at 546
[T]he Court finds that there are material variations in the proposed
class members’ wireless service agreements. These individualized
issues will predominate because determining the fact of injury will
require evaluating the particular terms of each individual class
member’s wireless service agreement, in order to determine whether
Defendant actually caused a breach or interference with the
agreement.
161. See id. (“[T]he Court could therefore not determine on a classwide or even
carrier-wide basis whether individual class members were actually entitled to

TEXT MESSAGES ARE PROPERTY

1101

likely members of the proposed class who did not have a
contractual right to send and receive text messages, the proposed
class was overbroad.162
The court’s denial of class certification effectively ended
Moore’s case, and without the strength of a class action lawsuit,
she withdrew her claim after presumably reaching an out-of-court
settlement with Apple.163
2. Can Apple Intercept Text Messages Under the Wiretap Act?
In Backhaut v. Apple, Inc.,164 plaintiffs Adam Backhaut, Joy
Backhaut, and Kenneth Morris (the Backhaut plaintiffs) sued
Apple for wrongfully intercepting and storing iMessages and
preventing former iPhone users from receiving iMessages.165 Adam
Backhaut and Kenneth Morris switched from iPhones to
non-Apple devices, and alleged that after making the switch they
failed to receive text messages sent from iPhone users.166 Joy
Backhaut remained an iPhone user during the litigation, and she
alleged that she sent her husband, Adam, text messages on her
iPhone following his switch to a non-Apple device that he did not
receive.167
The Backhaut plaintiffs claimed Apple’s intercepting, storing,
and withholding text messages violated the Stored

receive text messages.”).
162. Id. at 543.
163. See Petitioner Adrienne Moore’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Permission to Appeal Denial of Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(f) at 1, Moore v. Apple, Inc., No. 15-80209 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015) (“The parties
have reached a resolution in this action, thereby mooting the petition to appeal.”).
164. 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
165. See id. at 1037 (“The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that Apple
wrongfully intercepts, stores, and otherwise prevents former Apple device users
from receiving text messages sent to them from current Apple device users.”).
166. See id. at 1038–39 (explaining that Adam Backhaut and Kenneth Morris
purchased non-Apple devices after using iPhones and that both had difficulties
receiving text messages from current iPhone users).
167. See id. at 1038 (“Following Adam Backhaut’s switch, Plaintiff Joy
Backhaut continued to send him text messages from her iPhone. On Joy
Backhaut’s phone, the word ‘delivered’ appeared under her messages to her
spouse, but Adam Backhaut never received those messages.”).
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Communications Act,168 the Wiretap Act,169 California’s Unfair
Competition Law (UCL),170 and California’s Consumers Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA)171.172 The court quickly disposed of the
Backhaut plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claim for failure
to state a claim, CLRA claim for lack of standing, and UCL claim
for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.173 This left
Apple’s alleged Wiretap Act violations as the plaintiffs’ sole
surviving claim.174
The Backhaut plaintiffs alleged that Apple’s intentional
interception of iPhone users’ text messages sent to former iPhone
users violated the Wiretap Act.175 The Wiretap Act, which
“protects communications in transit,”176 bars the “interception” of
“wire, oral, or electronic communications” and grants a private
cause of action against any entity who “intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”177 The California federal district court analyzed
five factors to determine whether the Backhaut plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged a Wiretap Act violation: (1) whether the
plaintiffs alleged an actionable “interception”; (2) whether Apple’s
actions were within the “ordinary course of business exception”;
(3) whether the plaintiffs alleged intent; (4) whether Apple’s
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
170. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019
Reg. Sess.).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
172. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(outlining the Backhaut plaintiffs’ causes of action).
173. See id. at 1052 (listing the court’s ruling on the Backhaut plaintiffs’
Stored Communications Act claim, the CLRA claims, and the UCL claims).
174. See id. (“The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Wiretap Act Claim.”).
175. See id. at 1042 (summarizing the Backhaut plaintiffs’ claims that gave
rise to Apple’s alleged Wiretap Act violations).
176. See id. (distinguishing the Stored Communications Act, which protects
stored communications, from the Wiretap Act, which protects communications
that are in transit).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); id. § 2520.
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alleged acts fell within the statutory good faith exception to
liability; and (5) whether the plaintiffs consented to Apple’s text
message interceptions.178
First, the court determined that the Backhaut plaintiffs
alleged an actionable “interception” under the Wiretap Act because
the plaintiffs claimed that Apple intercepted and prevented text
messages from being delivered using a “device” and the plaintiffs
did not direct the messages toward Apple.179 The plaintiffs’ claimed
“interception” was Apple’s automated system of incorrectly
categorizing messages sent to former iPhone users as iMessages
instead of regular SMS/MMS text messages that were compatible
with their non-Apple devices.180 Second, the court found that the
Apple’s actions were not within the “ordinary course of business
exception” under the Wiretap Act because the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that Apple’s “interception” neither facilitated nor was
incidental to Apple’s business of transmitting electronic
communications.181 Third, the court determined that the plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged intent under the Wiretap Act because, in
addition to outright claiming that Apple intentionally intercepted
the text messages, the plaintiffs supported their allegation with
information that Apple had been aware of the issue since 2012 and
that Apple had even charged former iPhone users money to fix the
problem.182 And fourth, the court denied Apple’s claim that its
actions were covered by the “good faith exception” under the
Wiretap Act because it found that Apple fundamentally
misinterpreted the congressional intent behind the exception.183
178. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1042 (outlining Apple’s five arguments
as to why the Backhaut plaintiffs did not sufficiently state a Wiretap Act violation
claim).
179. See id. (explaining the court’s finding that the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged an actionable interception under the Wiretap Act).
180. See id. (clarifying the scheme the plaintiffs alleged Apple used to
“intercept” text messages).
181. See id. at 1043 (explaining why Apple’s claim that its actions in
“intercepting” text messages did not “fall within the ‘ordinary course of business’
exception under the Wiretap Act”).
182. See id. at 1044 (describing how the plaintiffs’ allegation that Apple
intended to intercept text messages satisfied the intent requirement under the
Wiretap Act).
183. See id. at 1047 (“To the extent Apple contends that Congress intended to
allow a good faith defense in reliance on any provision of the SCA and the Wiretap
Act, despite the explicit language of § 2520(d)(3) and § 2707(e)(3), that argument
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Thus, the Backhaut plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim turned on the
issue of the plaintiffs’ consent to Apple intercepting their text
messages. Under the Wiretap Act, it is lawful to intercept
electronic communication when a party “to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception.”184 Apple alleged that a
provision of the Apple iOS iPhone operating system license
agreement, which all iPhone users (including the Backhaut
plaintiffs) agreed to before using their iPhone and iMessage
software, evidenced the plaintiffs’ prior consent to Apple’s
intercepting their text messages.185 The relevant part of the
provision read: “[t]o facilitate delivery of your iMessages and to
enable you to maintain conversations across your devices, Apple
may hold your iMessages in encrypted form for a limited period of
time.”186
At the outset, the court noted that the consent of one of the
parties to the two-way text messaging communication was enough
to preclude liability.187 Because the Wiretap Act requires only “one
of the parties to the communication” give prior consent, either the
sender or the receiver of the text message could have consented to
Apple’s interception of the iMessages.188 However, the Backhaut
plaintiffs (with the exception of Joy) were former iPhone owners
who were no longer bound by Apple’s consent agreement, so the
court’s focus shifted to whether current iMessage users, who sent
the text messages to the Backhaut plaintiffs, actually consented to
Apple’s intercepting their text messages.189
is unavailing.”).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2012).
185. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(analyzing Apple’s defense that the plaintiffs provided prior “consent to Apple’s
interception of their text messages”).
186. Id.
187. See id. (“Apple is correct that consent of one of the parties to the
communication, here the sender, would be sufficient to preclude liability under
the Wiretap Act.”).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
189. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1045 (“The Court therefore addresses
whether current iPhone/iMessage users, like Plaintiff Joy Backhaut, have
consented to Apple’s ‘interception’ of text messages intended for former Apple
users.”).

TEXT MESSAGES ARE PROPERTY

1105

Although Apple argued that the above-quoted provision of its
iOS agreement proved current iMessage users consented to text
message interception, the court disagreed.190 The court narrowly
interpreted the provision at issue, explaining that “the license
agreement only informs users that Apple may hold your iMessages
in encrypted form for a limited period of time to facilitate delivery
of your iMessages” to other iMessage users.191 Noting that consent
is “not an all-or-nothing proposition,” the court determined that a
reasonable user could deduce from the provision that Apple
intercepts iMessages sent to other iMessage users, but does not
intercept text messages sent to non-iMessage users.192 For that
reason, the court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss the Wiretap Act
claim based on consent.193
Even though the Backhaut plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim
survived Apple’s motion to dismiss, the court would later deny the
plaintiffs’ Rule 23 motion for class certification.194 The plaintiffs
sought both certification of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3)
and certification of an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).195
The court refused to certify the plaintiffs’ class because (1) the
proposed class definition was unascertainable as there was no way
to prove proposed class members would be capable of reliable
self-identification, and (2) the individualized inquiry required to
190. See id. (“Apple relies solely on the bolded language in the iOS license
agreement in arguing that current Apple device users have consented to its
interception.”).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1046 (explaining that because consent is not absolute, “Apple
may be correct that current Apple users consent to the interception of their
messages for the purpose of ‘facilitating’ their delivery, however, it is less clear
that users consent to interception where such interception would guarantee
nondelivery”).
193. See id. (“Taken as a whole, a reasonable user could conclude that Apple
intercepts messages sent as iMesssages to other iMessage users, but that no such
interception occurs if the text message cannot be sent as an iMessage. As such,
the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Wiretap Act claim on the basis
of consent.”).
194. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (“Having considered the submissions of the parties,
the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs’
motion for class certification.”).
195. See id. at *3 (“Plaintiffs seek certification of a damages class under Rule
23(b)(3) and an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).”).
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determine whether a proposed class member impliedly consented
to Apple’s alleged interception would predominate over any
common questions of law or fact.196
Perhaps the most notable takeaway from the Backhaut
litigation is the court’s apparent waffling on the issue of consent to
interception under the Wiretap Act.197 After scarcely mentioning
implied consent at the motion to dismiss stage,198 the California
federal district court reversed course and used implied consent to
strike down the Backhaut plaintiffs’ proposed class.199 For a factfinder to find implied consent to interception under the Wiretap
Act, the fact-finder need not determine whether the text message
user had specific knowledge of Apple’s text message interceptions,
but rather that the surrounding circumstances were enough to
convincingly notify text message users of the interceptions.200
Borrowing its reasoning from In re Google Inc. Gmail
Litigation201 (hereinafter “the Gmail litigation”), the court
determined that “broad disclosures” of information regarding the
iMessage issue might be sufficient to put enough members of the
proposed class on notice of the problem.202 Because enough
196. See id. at *16 (“[T]he court finds that Plaintiffs . . . lack standing to seek
certification of an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2). Furthermore, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) is
unascertainable and that individualized issues with respect to consent
predominate over any common issues.”).
197. See id. at *15 (“Here, however, the predominance problems posed by
Defendant’s implied consent defense are distinct from the express consent defense
Defendant raised at the motion to dismiss stage.”).
198. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(explaining that consent under the Wiretap Act can be either express or implied,
but it must be actual).
199. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (“[T]he Court does find that the need to
determine, on an individual-by-individual basis, whether a proposed class
member impliedly consented to any alleged interception would predominate over
any common questions of law or fact.”).
200. See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that
“consent can only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly
show that the party knew about and consented to the interception”).
201. No. 13–MD–02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).
202. See id. at *20 (explaining how “a fact-finder could find implied consent
even based on broad disclosures”).
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members of the proposed class might have been on notice of the
iMessage problem, those members’ continued iMessage use
(following possible notice) might mean they impliedly consented to
the interception.203 In the Gmail litigation, seven years of regular
nationwide media coverage of Google’s scanning customers’
e-mails, coupled with a “panoply” of Google’s disclosures on the
issue, constituted “broad disclosures” on which the court based its
finding of implied consent.204 In contrast, the “broad disclosures” of
information regarding the iMessage problem that the court in
Backhaut relied on to find implied consent were tech blog posts,
tech blog comments, forum postings and comments on Apple’s
website, and a disclosure Apple posted on its website warning
users to deregister their iMessage before switching to a non-Apple
device.205
In effect, the Backhaut court found that blog posts, forum
posts, and a single disclosure on Apple’s website were equivalent
to seven years of nationwide media coverage and numerous
corporate disclosures in creating a potential implied consent
issue.206 Because the implied consent issue necessitated an inquiry
into the actual consent of each proposed class member, the court
found that the consent issue predominated any common questions
of law among class members and denied the Backhaut plaintiffs’
motion for class certification.207
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the Backhaut decision on
appeal.208 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the entire
203. See Backhaut, 2015 WL 4776427, at *14–15 (reasoning that “broad
disclosures” of news information might have been sufficient to put members of
the proposed class on notice of the iMessage interceptions).
204. See In re Gmail Litig., 2014 WL 1102660, at *18–20 (listing the sources
of information disclosure that led the court to find that consent cannot be
determined on a class-wide basis).
205. See Backhaut, 2015 WL 4776427, at *15 (listing the various sources of
information available covering the iMessage delivery issues).
206. See id. (explaining that public information available concerning the
iMessage issue might be sufficient to put iMessage users on notice because news
articles were arguably evidence of implied consent in the Gmail litigation).
207. See id. (“In sum, the Court finds that the highly individualized and
fact-specific inquiry required to determine whether a proposed class member
impliedly consented to Defendant’s alleged interception would predominate over
any common questions of law or fact.”).
208. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 15-17523, 723 Fed. Appx. 405, 407–408
(9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) (upholding the district court’s decision to dismiss the
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consent issue, and determined that text messages held in
“temporary storage” are not intercepted under the Wiretap Act.209
Additionally, the court found that the “misclassification” by the
sender of a message as an iMessage (instead of a text message) to
a former iPhone user caused the problem, and not Apple’s faulty
iMessage-to-text message handoff system.210 Just as the judiciary
has proven ineffective at protecting text message users’ rights
against corporate overreach, the Constitution is likewise
inadequate at protecting their rights against government
overreach.
B. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Text Messages: The
Third-Party Loophole
Our cell phones and constitutional law collide when law
enforcement officials seek to search the contents of our cell phones
as part of an arrest, investigation, or prosecution. Consider
another scenario: on the day of Mark’s high school senior prom,
someone calls in a bomb threat to Mark’s high school. Mark is sent
home for the day along with everyone else, and much to his
surprise the police soon show up at his front door prepared to
arrest him for the bomb threat.
Seven months before the bomb threat, Mark texted his friend,
“Prom this year will be the BOMB!” Following the bomb threat,
Mark’s cellular service provider’s linguistics algorithms flagged
Mark’s text message for containing the words “prom” and “bomb,”
and Mark’s third-party service provider quickly handed this text
message off to the police.211 Solely because of Mark’s
plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment).
209. See id. (“[T]he message was no longer in transmission—it was in
temporary storage—and so under Konop could not be ‘intercepted’ within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act.”).
210. See id. at 407 (finding that there was no interception, just a
“misclassification [which] occurred when the recipient’s phone number was first
entered in the ‘To’ field by the user of the Apple product trying to send a message.
This misclassification occurred before any message was sent, not ‘during
transmission’ of a message”).
211. See JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW
DIGITAL SERFDOM 115 (1st ed. 2017) (outlining the process by which the
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seven-month-old text to his friend, he just became the prime
suspect in the bomb threat investigation. But how could the police
read Mark’s text messages if they had no probable cause to believe
he called in the bomb threat?
Text messages, a protected “paper” under the Fourth
Amendment,212 may be searched and read by the police without
probable cause because of the third-party doctrine.213 The Fourth
Amendment bans the government from conducting warrantless
searches and seizures.214 This ban on government action seeks to
strike a balance between privacy and security.215 In practice, the
Fourth Amendment splits law enforcement conduct into two
categories: police actions that require a warrant, and police actions
that do not.216 The police do not need a search warrant to monitor
occurrences in public, but the police do need a search warrant to
monitor your home or private mail because of the Fourth
Amendment.217
The Constitution bars the government from warrantlessly
searching content stored directly on your cell phone,218 as it likely
contains more sensitive information than your entire home.219
However, because the Fourth Amendment restricts government
action only under the state action doctrine, private third-party
actors (e.g., non-government companies and individuals) are not
government obtains text messages from third parties).
212. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 115 (explaining the logistics of the
third-party doctrine).
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”).
215. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 574 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures is premised on a balance between privacy and security.”).
216. See id. (“To implement that balance, the Supreme Court has created two
basic categories of law enforcement conduct: investigative steps that the Fourth
Amendment regulates and those that it does not.”).
217. See id. (comparing the actions the police need a search warrant for to the
actions the police do not need a search warrant for).
218. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014) (extending the
Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizures to data within a cell
phone).
219. See id. at 398 (2014) (“[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”).
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constitutionally barred from searching the contents of your cell
phone.220 Thus, the Constitution restricts the government from
searching the contents of your cell phone, but there is no
equivalent law that restricts the private sector from conducting a
search that would be illegal if a government actor performed it.
This inconsistency has been termed the “third-party loophole,” or
the “third-party doctrine.”221
Under the third-party doctrine, an individual who voluntarily
conveys information to a third party (e.g., a cellular service
provider) maintains no reasonable expectation of privacy.222 Put
another way, if a consumer voluntarily reveals information to a
business, the consumer takes the risk that the business will give
that information to the government.223 Normally, the government
cannot search something someone reasonably expects to be
private, but once someone conveys that interest to a third party,
their reasonable expectation of privacy is lost.224 Thus, the
third-party loophole allows the government to freely obtain
consumer electronic communications from cellular service
providers that the government would not otherwise be able to
gather without a warrant.225
Although courts historically applied the third-party doctrine
to a discrete set of records-related categories,226 in modern-day
220. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 613 (2015) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does
not stop private companies from conducting searches and seizures).
221. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 115–16 (discussing the third-party
exception to data searches and naming it the “third-party loophole”).
222. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
223. See id. at 745 (explaining that because the petitioner voluntarily
conveyed information to a business, the “petitioner assumed the risk that the
information would be divulged to police”).
224. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government.”).
225. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 220, at 613 (discussing how the
third-party doctrine enables the government to get around the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement).
226. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07–CR–0023–MHS/AJB, 2008
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jurisprudence, the third-party doctrine has evolved into a single
test: if any information is disclosed to a third party, then that
information becomes public and it is not entitled to the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.227 This has led to a drastic
expansion of the government’s ability to obtain information.228 By
analogy, the government previously used the third-party doctrine
to read the address written on the outside of a sealed letter; now,
the government uses the same doctrine to read the contents of the
letter itself.229
Even if a user conveys information to a third party
confidentially and under the assumption that the third party will
use it for only limited purposes, the information nonetheless loses
its Fourth Amendment protection.230 For example, the third-party
doctrine allows the government to, without a warrant, request the
contents of e-mails sent through the Google’s e-mail platform
“Gmail,” because Gmail users agreed to allow Google read the
contents of their e-mails.231 Gmail users might expect that Google
will keep the contents of their e-mails confidential, but because

WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (categorizing the third-party doctrine
as applying to six situations: “(1) bank records; (2) credit card statements; (3)
kilowatt consumption from electric utility records; (4) motel registration records;
(5) cell phone records; and (6) employment records”).
227. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1931
(2017) (explaining that the modern third-party doctrine “has calcified into a
binary one, in which any information disclosed to a third party for any reason is
public and does not merit Fourth Amendment protection”).
228. See Kerr, supra note 215, at 587 (explaining how a common criticism of
the third-party doctrine is that “it gives the government too much power”).
229. See id. (comparing the government’s past use of the third-party doctrine
to the government’s current use of the doctrine).
230. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by the third party to government
authorities, even if the information is revealed to the third party confidentially
and on the assumption that it will be used only for limited purposes.”).
PRIVACY
POLICY
(2017),
231. See
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf
(“Our automated systems analyze your content (including emails) to provide you
personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored
advertising, and spam and malware detection.”).
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Gmail users allow Google to read the contents of their e-mails,232
the government does not need a warrant to access the e-mails.233
Congress tried to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections of electronic communications with the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).234 However, the SCA merely provides
temporary Fourth Amendment protection of electronic
communications stored on third-party servers.235 Under the SCA,
once text messages stored on a third-party server are greater than
180 days old, the government is no longer required to obtain a
warrant with probable cause to access the text messages.236 Apple,
for instance, stores iPhone users’ iMessages and SMS messages on
its iCloud servers.237 Consequently, after an iPhone user’s text
message is more than 180 days old, the SCA does not protect that
text message, and the government may compel Apple to disclose
the text message even though no warrant has been issued.238
232. Id.
233. See Note, supra note 227, at 1931 (using Google as an example of a
situation in which “it is not difficult to imagine that one would want and expect
to be able to keep some information private in certain respects but not in others”).
234. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection
Erodes as E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1072 (2008) (“Congress passed
the ECPA in 1986 to draw clear lines as to where Fourth Amendment protection
extends with emerging technologies.”).
235. See id. at 1044–45 (explaining that digital messages stored on a third
party server are no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
requirement under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act after they are
over 180 days old).
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of
a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by
the means available under subsection (b).”); id. (outlining how “[a] governmental
entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents
of any wire or electronic communication” with delayed notice pursuant to Section
2705); id. § 2705 (describing the process the government can take to indefinitely
delay notifying the customer whose electronic communications the government
searched pursuant to § 2703(a)).
237. See Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“iMessage and SMS messages are backed up on
iCloud for your convenience, but you can turn iCloud Backup off whenever you
want.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
238. See Oza, supra note 234, at 1044–45 (explaining how once electronic
communications are stored for greater than 180 days on a third-party server, the
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In sum, as we store nearly our entire digital lives on
third-party, cloud-based servers in one way or another,239 the
third-party loophole has crippled the Fourth Amendment’s
protection over stored communications.240 Although this paints a
bleak picture for consumers hoping to keep the government from
intruding into their private text message inbox, a potential stopgap
exists in an area of law much more ancient than the electronic
devices and data at issue: property law.241
V. The Solution is Property Law
This Part argues that text messages constitute intangible
personal property.242 This leads to two separate practical
outcomes: first, plaintiffs such as those in the Moore and Backhaut
cases would have been successful had they sued Apple under
property-based causes of action;243 and second, text messages, as
property, should receive increased Fourth Amendment protections
against warrantless searches, thus closing the third-party
loophole.244
A. Text Messages Are Property
Under Kremen, text messages constitute an intangible
personal property if they are (1) “an interest capable of precise
definition”; (2) “capable of exclusive possession or control”; and (3)
there is a “legitimate claim to exclusivity.”245
electronic communications are no longer protected by the ECPA’s probable cause
requirement).
239. See Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 524 (2017)
(discussing the proliferation of information stored on the cloud).
240. See Oza, supra note 234, at 1044–45 (“As more of our personal
information is electronically stored on third-party servers, this exception
threatens to nullify the Fourth Amendment.”).
241. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 114 (arguing that the law of property
trespass should pick up for third parties where the Fourth Amendment stops).
242. Infra Part V.A.
243. Infra Part V.B.
244. Infra Part V.C.
245. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (outlining the
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First, text messages are an interest capable of precise
definition because the text within the message itself is precisely
worded for the recipient.246 Although there is not a theoretically
finite amount of text messages in the same way there are a limited
amount of domain names or plots of land, each text message sent
is a unique interaction between the sender and receiver at the time
and place of its sending that cannot be recreated by others.247
Second, text messages are capable of exclusive possession and
control because cell phone owners have sole possession of the text
messages they have sent and received on their own personal
devices.248 A cell phone owner has exclusive possession and control
over the messages contained within their cell phone’s text message
application.249
Finally, text message owners have a legitimate claim to
exclusivity over their text messages because encryption and phone
security features protect the messages and ensure the content of
the messages remains private between the sender and receiver.250
Some courts, in addition to applying some form of the Kremen
test, also require the intangible personal property to have a basis
in a tangible property.251 This means that the digital “thing” has to
have some sort of a connection to a physical object, but the owner
Ninth Circuit’s three-part test to determine whether a digital object constitutes
an intangible personal property).
246. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining
the process by which a user sends a text message to the recipient).
247. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (determining that a domain name is a
well-defined interest by likening it to “a share of corporate stock or a plot of land”).
248. See id. (finding that a domain name owner has exclusive possession and
control of the domain name because the domain name registrant alone makes the
decision on what domain to purchase).
249. Id.
250. See id. (“[R]egistrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering
a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs
others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.”).
251. See, e.g., Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No.
16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (“[M]any
courts have applied trespass to chattels to actions taken in cyberspace. But there
is no consensus among the courts. Some courts found personal intangible property
is chattel. Other courts concluded trespass to chattel, including a claim related to
intangible property, must have a connection to tangible property.”).
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need not have control over the physical object.252 Although this
might be a tough element for other cloud-based forms of intangible
property, such as e-mails, to overcome, text messages easily
surpass this threshold. Text messages are connected to, and stored
directly on, the one object everyone has within an arm’s length at
all times: cellular phones.253 And if an argument is made that the
text messages themselves are not stored within the phone but
rather stored on servers scattered around the world (the “cloud”),
it makes no difference, as the servers themselves are tangible
property.254
Consequently, text messages constitute a form of intangible
personal property. The recent uptick in federal courts finding that
e-mails constitute personal property signals that it will not be long
until courts determine that text messages are property.255 With
that in mind, would the iMessage plaintiffs have succeeded had
they brought claims based on the theory that their text messages
were their property?
B. Why the iMessage Plaintiffs Should Have Succeeded
The iMessage cases share similar facts: former iPhone users
sued Apple, alleging that Apple interfered with their receiving text
messages after they switched to a non-Apple cellular device.256 The
iMessage cases even share the same judge, as Judge Lucy H. Koh
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
252. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1033 (“Assuming arguendo that California
retains some vestigial merger requirement, it is clearly minimal, and at most
requires only some connection to a document or tangible object—not
representation of the owner’s intangible interest in the strict Restatement
sense.”).
253. See Ellen Brait, Smash It, Shred It, Wipe It: The Tom Brady Guide to
Destroying Text Messages, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2015, 12:47 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/29/tom-brady-deflategatedestroy-text-messages-cellphone (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining how text
messages are stored both on cell phones themselves and also stored on cellular
service providers’ servers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
254. Id.
255. Supra notes 118–126 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background).
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authored both opinions.257 And, unfortunately, the iMessage cases
also share similar results: the plaintiffs lost at the class
certification stage.258
Would the outcome have been different if the plaintiffs
pursued a trespass to chattels or conversion cause of action against
Apple? This subpart applies the intangible personal property
theory to the iMessage litigation’s facts: first, the court would
decide whether the plaintiffs had a valid trespass to chattels or
conversion claim;259 and second, the court would determine
whether to certify the plaintiffs’ proposed class action lawsuit.260
1. As Property, Text Messages Can Be Converted or Trespassed
Upon
As established, text messages constitute a form of property
under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Kremen.261 The hypothetical
court would initially determine whether the text message property
was taken (conversion) or disrupted (trespass to chattels).262 Using
the iMessage litigation as our facts, where Apple blocked former
iMessage users from receiving text messages after the former users
switched to non-Apple devices, the former iMessage users would
likely prevail (at least individually) on both a trespass to chattels
claim and a conversion claim against Apple.263
257. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background).
258. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore case’s
conclusion following the court’s refusal to certify the class); supra notes 208–210
and accompanying text (discussing the Backhaut case’s conclusion following the
plaintiffs’ unsuccessful appeal).
259. Infra Part V.A.1.
260. Infra Part IV.A.2.
261. Supra Part IV.A.
262. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS,
2017 WL 4413288, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (explaining how before the court
can determine if a trespass to chattels occurred, the court must determine
whether e-mails fall within the definition of a chattel).
263. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text
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Under California law, “a trespass to chattels claim lies where
(1) an intentional interference with (2) the possession of personal
property has (3) proximately caused injury.”264 First, the courts in
the iMessage litigation found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
that Apple likely intended to slow down or delay the messages sent
from iPhone users to former iPhone users because it was aware of
the problem and did not act to fix it.265 Second, Apple interfered
with possession of the iMessage users’ property because Apple’s
actions delayed and prevented the former iPhone owners from
possessing and receiving their text messages.266
The third prong, whether Apple proximately caused injury by
intercepting and withholding the text messages, is the most
challenging to establish. In California, specifically in the context of
a computer or digital system, “injury is adequately alleged where
the plaintiff pleads that the purported trespass deprived plaintiff
of the use of personal property for a substantial time.”267 The
plaintiffs in the iMessage litigation never received the missing text
messages from iMessage users who attempted to text message
them after they switched to non-Apple devices.268 Although Apple
could argue that its iMessage deregistration system takes effect
after forty-eight hours, the plaintiffs did not register for this
system before switching to non-Apple devices, and thus the
deregistration issue is moot.269
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background).
264. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350–51 (Cal. 2003).
265. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Plaintiffs have alleged that Apple knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately
intercepted text messages. On a motion to dismiss, these allegations are
sufficient.”).
266. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Plaintiff alleges that Apple failed to disclose that use of iMessage and Messages
would result in undelivered messages if an iPhone user switched to a non-Apple
device.”).
267. Grace v. Apple Inc., No. 17-CV-00551, 2017 WL 3232464, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. July 28, 2017).
268. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (“Following Adam Backhaut’s
switch, Plaintiff Joy Backhaut continued to send him text messages from her
iPhone. On Joy Backhaut’s phone, the word ‘delivered’ appeared under her
messages to her spouse, but Adam Backhaut never received those messages.”).
269. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1196 (“Plaintiff noticed she was not
receiving text messages she expected to receive from users of Apple devices. After
this initial discovery, Plaintiff contacted her service provider, Verizon Wireless,
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When Apple failed to deliver the text messages to the
former iMessage users in the iMessage litigation, it injured
the plaintiffs because it deprived them of the use of their
property for a substantial time.270 Thus, because Apple
intentionally interfered with the former iMessage users’ text
messages and proximately caused injury, the plaintiffs in the
iMessage litigation would have likely succeeded in their
trespass to chattels claim against Apple.
To establish the tort of conversion, the iMessage
plaintiffs must show (1) that they owned the text messages;
(2) that Apple’s actions constituted a wrongful disposition of
a property right; and (3) damages.271 As established above,
text messages constitute intangible personal property, so the
iMessage plaintiffs satisfy the first “property” prong. The
iMessage plaintiffs should succeed in proving that Apple’s
interception of the text messages constituted a wrongful
disposition of a property right, as the plaintiffs never received
their text messages.272 And the plaintiffs will satisfy the
damages requirement because their cellular contracts
guaranteed the plaintiffs the right to send text messages, and
Apple’s interference with the text messages deprived the
plaintiffs of the “full benefit of [their] contractual bargain.”273
Thus, the iMessage plaintiffs would have likely succeeded
had they brought a conversion cause of action against Apple.
which informed her that she needed to ‘turn off’ Messages on her old iPhone.”).
270. See Grace, 2017 WL 3232464, at *13 (finding that the FaceTime plaintiffs
satisfied the injury element because they sufficiently alleged “that Apple’s
disabling of FaceTime ‘impaired the condition, quality, or value’ of their iPhones”
(quoting Fields v. Wise Media, LLC, No. C 12-05160 WHA, 2013 WL 5340490, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2013))).
271. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To establish
[conversion], a plaintiff must show ownership or right to possession of property,
wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.”).
272. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (explaining how a plaintiff never
received the missing text messages).
273. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Plaintiff alleges that Apple’s interference with the receipt of her text messages
deprived her of the full benefit of her contractual bargain with Verizon
Wireless.”).
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2. The Final Step: Class Certification
Taking our hypothetical iMessage litigation to its conclusion,
the final step, following the iMessage plaintiffs’ successful
individual trespass to chattels or conversion claims against Apple,
would be the class certification stage. Judge Koh might well deny
class certification again, as she has turned Rule 23(b)(3) damages
class certification into a nearly impenetrable barrier for plaintiffs
to break through.274 However, the iMessage plaintiffs’ novel
property-based causes of action, combined with Judge Koh’s
comparative leniency toward Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class
certifications, gives the iMessage plaintiffs a realistic chance at
clearing the class certification hurdle.275 Moreover, injunctive
relief would better serve the iMessage plaintiffs’ goals, as the court
could, in effect, force Apple to deliver the missing text messages to
former iMessage users right away.276 As the court already found
that the iMessage litigants satisfied Article III standing, the court
would analyze whether the plaintiffs met the requirements for an
injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2).277
To establish an injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2), the
iMessage plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered a “concrete
and particularized” harm and that they are “subject to a likelihood
of future injury.”278 Although the plaintiffs in Backhaut failed in
274. See Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2016 WL 7428810,
at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ proposed classes because they
did not meet the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement); In re Google Inc.
Gmail Litig., No. 13– MD– 02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
18, 2014) (finding that the plaintiffs did not meet “their burden of demonstrating
that the proposed classes satisfy the [Rule 23(b)(3)] predominance requirement”);
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11– CV–02509–LHK, 2013 WL
1352016, at *587 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (denying plaintiffs’ class certification
because the proposed class did not meet the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement).
275. See In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for an injunctive class certification under Rule
23(b)(2)).
276. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
729, 734 (2013) (explaining how injunctive claims can be the most important part
of a class action).
277. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 541 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“In sum,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the standing requirements under
Article III.”).
278. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427,
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their attempt to certify an injunctive class because they could not
prove a threat of future injury,279 the plaintiffs in Moore obtained
internal Apple documents through discovery that proved Apple
was aware that “hundreds of former iPhone users reported
attempting deactivation but were still not receiving text messages
from Apple device users.”280 And while the Moore case turned on
the issue of reading every single proposed class member’s contract
to determine whether there had indeed been a “harm,” the harm
question under a conversion or trespass to chattels theory would
be much simpler: Did the proposed class members fail to receive
text messages they were supposed to?281 Yes.282 Therefore, the
plaintiffs would have probably succeeded in certifying an
injunctive class because the plaintiffs could use Apple’s knowledge
of the problem to prove both present harm and future harm.283
That is why, if iMessage plaintiffs brought either trespass to
chattels or conversion claims against Apple for Apple’s disrupting
their text message delivery, and if the court agreed that text
messages constitute intangible personal property, the result would
have been different. The plaintiffs would have certified their Rule

at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (outlining the requirements necessary “to establish
standing for injunctive relief”).
279. See id. at *8–9 (explaining how each of the Backhaut plaintiffs have
either started using iPhones again or begun receiving text messages from current
iPhone users, indicating that there was no risk of future harm).
280. See Moore, 309 F.R.D. at 537 (reviewing internal documents “apparently
discussing how Apple’s ‘so-called fixes’ failed to address the disruptions in text
message delivery”).
281. See In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07–05152 JW, 2010 WL
3521965, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010), vacated in part, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168
(2011) (explaining that certifying an injunctive class is appropriate if the
plaintiffs prove that, should they succeed on the merits, injunctive relief would be
“reasonably necessary and appropriate”).
282. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1196 (“Plaintiff is not the only former Apple
device user to encounter the problem of undelivered text messages. ‘[C]ountless’
former Apple device users have not received messages sent by Apple device
users.”).
283. See Moore, 309 F.D.R. at 542 (denying class certification because the
plaintiff’s proposed class included “individuals who did not pay or contract for text
messaging services,” and were thus not harmed by Apple’s withholding their text
messages).
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23(b)(2) injunctive class.284 Apple would have then been forced to
begin delivering text messages sent to former iMessage users. And
current iPhone owners might even feel comfortable leaving Apple’s
“walled garden” ecosystem to try out a competitor’s cellular device
without fear that Apple will “lose” text messages meant for
them.285
C. Why the Third-Party Loophole Will Begin to Close
Recall that the third-party loophole is the exception that
enables the government to obtain consumer information from
companies without a search warrant.286 Although the Fourth
Amendment bars the government from searching the contents of
your cell phone without a warrant, the Constitution does not bar
the government from searching the same exact information when
it is stored on the cloud instead of your cell phone.287 While courts
have begun closing the third-party loophole as it pertains to
e-mails sent through and stored with internet service providers
(ISPs), courts have not shown the same willingness to protect text
messages stored on the cloud and sent through wireless service
providers.288
Classifying text messages as property closes the third-party
loophole for two reasons. First, text message owners manifest their
284. See In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 3521965, at *14
(certifying the proposed injunctive class because the plaintiffs proved that
“injunctive relief from the challenged conduct would be reasonably necessary and
appropriate if Plaintiffs succeed on the merits”).
285. See supra notes 132–137 and accompanying text (describing iPhone
users who feel locked in to their device and unable to switch to another type of
cell phone because of iMessage).
286. Supra Part II.B.
287. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014) (extending
constitutional “probable cause” protection to information stored within a cell
phone).
288. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266,
288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that because “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of emails” sent or stored with ISPs, “[t]he
government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a
subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause”).
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intent to prevent third parties and the government from reading
the content of their encrypted property.289 This “intent to prevent”
is at odds with the third-party doctrine’s theory that an individual
who voluntarily conveys information to a third party has no
reasonable expectation of privacy.290
Extending personal property protections to text messages
introduces a different legal theory relevant to determining
whether the text messages can be searched without a warrant: the
“container doctrine.”291 Under the container doctrine, courts give
seemingly-abandoned personal property contained within a secure
container greater constitutional protections against warrantless
searches because the act of securing personal property shows the
owner’s express manifest intent to keep the property protected.292
Text messages, an intangible personal property, are placed outside
of their owner’s control when they are stored on the cloud.293 And

289. See David Kravets, Here’s A Good Reason to Encrypt Your Data, WIRED
(Apr. 23, 2013, 6:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/encrypt-your-data/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining that a “top reason” to encrypt data “is to keep
the government out of your hard drive”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
290. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding that one
has no expectation of privacy in information handed over to third parties).
291. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 127 (“[O]utside of the owner’s
possession or control, the property can be considered abandoned, at least for
privacy purposes, and thus can be searched. This is the abandonment doctrine.
On the other hand, property placed inside containers has historically been given
much stronger protection from searches and seizures.”).
292. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 (1977)
By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker,
respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain
free from public examination. No less than one who locks the doors of
his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal
possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause. There being no exigency, it was
unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search without the
safeguards a judicial warrant provides.
293. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 128 (explaining how “[t]he very
purpose of [digital] assets is that they are [stored] away from their owners but not
out of their owners’ control”).
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remember that Apple stores copies of all iMessage and SMS
communications on the cloud.294 AT&T and Verizon do too.295
The classic example of property receiving greater protections
against warrantless searches is a padlocked box, whose owner
manifested an intent to keep the property protected by locking the
box.296 By analogy, a text message owner should receive
heightened protections against warrantless searches because the
owner, by “locking” the contents of the text message with
encryption technology, has manifested an intent to keep the
property protected, even if Apple stores a copy of the text message
on an iCloud server outside the possession of its owner.
Text message users rely on iMessage’s end-to-end encryption
to keep their text messages secure both in the cloud and in
transit.297 Also, most text message users rely on their smartphone’s
lock screen to keep unwanted intruders out of their text message
inbox.298 Encryption, coupled with smartphone security features,
serve as the text message user’s manifest intent and expectation
that their text messages be secure against unwanted intrusions.

294. See Privacy, supra note 237 (“iMessage and SMS messages are backed
up on iCloud for your convenience, but you can turn iCloud Backup off whenever
you want.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
295. See
AT&T
Privacy
Policy,
AT&T,
http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy/terms#collect (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
(“We may collect different types of information based on your use of our products
and services and on our business relationship with you. Examples of this might
include . . . the number of text messages sent and received . . . [and] calling and
texting records.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Privacy
Policy, VERIZON (Jan. 2018), http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/full-privacypolicy (last updated April 2018) (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“We collect
information when you communicate with us and when you use our products,
services and sites.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
296. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 (“By placing personal effects inside a
double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination.”).
297. See About iMessage and SMS/MMS, APPLE (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207006 (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (explaining
the security differences between iMessages and SMS text messages) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
298. See Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2019) (outlining how 72% of smartphone users “use a screen lock
or other security features” to secure their devices) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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A text message owner’s plainly evident intent to prevent
unwanted intrusions during transit and storage does not square
with the third-party doctrine’s legal fiction that the same text
message owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy if she
sends her text message through a cellular service provider. The
opposite is true. A text message owner’s intent to prevent
unwanted intrusions into her text message property proves her
reasonable expectation of privacy.299 Consequently, as the text
message owner retains her reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the text message’s content during transit and storage,
the third-party loophole closes because the government cannot
collect information which has not been disclosed to the third party.
Second, text messages, as a form of property and not merely
confidential information, are encrypted to prevent third parties
from viewing the text message’s content.300 Instead of traveling
through cyberspace as an open book, the encrypted text message
travels under lock and key, and thus the content within is at no
point conveyed to the cellular service provider.301 Because a
third-party service provider never sees the content hidden by
encryption, the text message’s content is never revealed to the
service provider.
If the content remains hidden behind encryption, then the text
message user has not voluntarily conveyed the content to the
provider because the provider does not see the content.302 As well,
the service provider cannot claim it saw the text message’s content
confidentially because it never saw the content at all.303 Cellular
299. See Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that the government may not collect e-mails under the third-party
doctrine because the e-mail users retained their reasonable expectation of
privacy).
300. See Kopfstein, infra note 304 (explaining why Apple encrypts iMessages).
301. See id. (describing iMessage’s end-to-end encryption and how it (in
theory) means that only the sender and the recipient will read the message’s
content).
302. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
303. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding that one’s expectation of confidentiality with regard to information
shared with third parties has no bearing on the information’s Fourth Amendment
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service providers are not meant to read any of the text message’s
content—even if they do anyway—by virtue of the text message
remaining sealed (encrypted) in transit and during storage.304 So,
because a text message owner does not convey the content of the
text message to the cellular service provider, confidentially or
otherwise, the government cannot get the text message’s content
using the third-party loophole.305
Just as the government cannot open up a sealed letter and
read its contents without a warrant, the government should be
prevented from opening up encrypted text messages, whether
stored or in transit, without a warrant.306 Although the framers
had sealed letters in mind when adopting the Fourth Amendment,
there is hardly a more appropriate modern analogy than an
encrypted text message.307
VI. Conclusion
Courts have yet to consider whether text messages constitute
intangible personal property, but they will soon. As our lives
protections).
304. See Janus Kopfstein, Apple Can Still See Your iMessages If You Enable
iCloud,
VICE
(Jan.
22,
2016,
4:10
PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/78kv7b/psa-apple-can-still-see-yourimessages-if-you-enable-icloud (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
It turns out the privacy benefits Apple likes to talk about (and the FBI
likes to complain about) basically disappear when iCloud Backup is
enabled. Your messages, photos and whatnot are still protected while
on your device and encrypted end-to-end while in transit. But you’re
also telling your device to CC Apple on everything. Those copies are
encrypted on iCloud using a key controlled by Apple, not you, allowing
the company (and thus anyone who gets access to your account) to see
their contents.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
305. See id. (“Apple can’t read messages sent between Apple devices because
they’re encrypted end-to-end, decipherable only by you and the intended
recipient.”).
306. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1308 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he framers were concerned with the protection of physical rather than virtual
correspondence. But a more obvious analogy from principle to new technology is
hard to imagine and, indeed, many courts have already applied the common law’s
ancient trespass to chattels doctrine to electronic, not just written,
communications.”).
307. Id.
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become more and more centered around our smartphones, text
messages will displace e-mails as the primary means of electronic
communication (if that hasn’t already happened). We currently do
not have an effective means of recourse available should our
cellular providers purposefully block or delete our text messages.
The answer lies in property law. Text messages constitute
intangible personal property, and text message owners can,
therefore, sue using traditional property law causes of action such
as trespass to chattels or conversion. Although there have been few
legal challenges brought by aggrieved text message owners, they
have been universally unsuccessful in causing cellular providers to
change their ways.308 Had these aggrieved text message owners
sued under a property-based cause of action, they would have
successfully enjoined the cellular providers from continuing to
mess with their text messages.
Moreover, a judicial determination that text messages
constitute intangible personal property will close the third-party
loophole. As it stands, the government is free to search the contents
of our text messages because we have voluntarily conveyed the
information to our cellular service providers.309 However, if courts
find that text messages constitute a form of property, an encrypted
text message starts to look more and more like a sealed letter than
it does public information. The framers designed the Fourth
Amendment to prevent unwarranted searches and seizures of the
dominant form of communication of their day: sealed letters.
Consequently, it makes sense to extend the Fourth Amendment’s
protection only to the dominant form of communication today:
encrypted text messages.

308.
309.

Supra Part IV.A.
Supra Part IV.B.

